EURIM Working Group Minutes

Working Party:	Theme 01/ Working Group
Ref:	01-T02-Int-Min01
Minuter:	Emma Fryer
Date:	19/11/01
Circulation:	Attendees and Apologies
Queries to:	Emma Fryer, Tel: 0191 384 0282 Mob: 07714 803 650 Emma.fryer@eurim.org
Minutes of the EURIM Theme 2 (Modernising Government) planning meeting on Interoperability 19^th November 2001, kindly hosted by Consignia
Summary
Topic: Interoperability
Purpose of Meeting
To scope the issue of interoperability, identify what EURIM could do to add value to the debate and help accelerate the modernising government agenda, and outline deliverables and parameters of activity for the EURIM interoperability group.
Summary of Situation
1. Many good things had already been achieved both in private and public sectors and should be publicised 2. The public sector was hampered from implementing interoperability by the fragmented nature of current administrative frameworks and a lack of end-to-end ownership to drive change. 3. There was a general lack of understanding of interoperability and associated issues, which necessitated a major educative exercise. 4. Interoperability was a multi-layered subject, which required a holistic approach. Traditionally people had approached it from different levels and perspectives, which led to partial solutions.
Main actions agreed
The group agreed to produce two documents – an overview of or “guide” to issues for parliamentarians, and an illustrative document in support of the guide comprising useful case studies. An initial draft of the guide and a skeleton of the illustrative document to be prepared for circulation to the immediate group from the end of November. Members of the Interoperability group to submit comments on the draft guide, and illustrative case studies (such as Newham), by the end of December. (See end of minutes for suggested case studies) This draft to be formally revised at a drafting meeting in early January for wider dissemination within EURIM for further comment in February 2002.
Other Actions Agreed
1. Define terms with a map or simple illustrative examples of interoperability –point 2.5 2. Look at the interoperability measures already in place in government and assess their effectiveness – 3.8 3. Drive home the message that lack of interoperability was a key barrier to realising the modernising government agenda by 2005 – 6.2 4. EURIM should concentrate on the political dimension, where it could add most value – 6.7
Tabled Papers
Agenda Terms of Reference for Group
Next Meeting Date
The next meeting was provisionally scheduled for the afternoon of Monday 8^th January. Please note that this may be subject to revision.

Meeting Notes

			Action
1		Chairman’s Introduction
	1.1	HT welcomed everyone to the inaugural meeting of the EURIM Interoperability Group and outlined two major objectives- to identify areas where EURIM could add value on interoperability and to outline the actions required to effect this.
	1.2	He drew attention to the Terms of Reference for the group and asked for feedback, so that they could establish priorities for action and eschew overlap with other initiatives both within and outside EURIM.
		Discussion on Terms of Reference
2		Scope of Group
	2.1	HT stressed the need to look at interoperability from the point of view of the “beneficiary” – the recipient of Government service. This was agreed.
	2.2	AN suggested that they should also look at those supplying services to government as well as those using them, and that the local-to-central Government interface was also a major problem area.
	2.3	BM noted that effective delivery to customers ultimately relied on interoperability between government systems. He agreed with AN that Government agencies, devolved administrations and the EC must also be taken into account.
	2.4	AN noted that as more Government services were pushed toward the private sector this was not just a Government issue but one for commerce in general.
	2.5	PV noted that personal identity and authentication routines were major interoperability issues. A EURIM workshop on personal identity at the management and political level was scheduled for 27^th November.
	2.6	DR stressed the need to see things in terms of value, which should be traced right up the supply chain. He recommended that the group start by defining terms – with the use of a “map” or simple examples illustrating what was meant by interoperability in this context. This was agreed.
3		Current situation
	3.1	HT noted that too much focus on process management when putting systems together obscured other important aspects like common data definitions. MB agreed that, although process analysis was essential, data definitions were very important and were sometimes far too complex.
	3.2	HT noted that advanced communications were leading to increased data normalisation on a global scale (Microsoft’s MyServices, AOL Magic Carpet and Sun’s Liberty Alliance being examples). AN remarked that such information, and the metadata describing it, should be instantly comprehensible regardless of the process it related to. This required a versatile but precise script analysis. HT noted that this kind of resource description framework with metadata was already present in the internet world under the title “semantic web”.
	3.3	The group agreed to obtain an update on the situation both within the Health Service and the police force. The lack of interoperability across the criminal justice system was a classic case study. There were too many stakeholders and no owner of the end-to-end process. No amount of sophisticated management strategies would solve this without political will.
	3.4	Ignorance management, not knowledge management was really the subject. The difference between the public and private sectors was that there were no coherent ownership structures in place to drive progress.
	3.5	DR noted, and it was agreed, that political accountability was necessary to achieve progress, and cited the successful case of the Irish Government IT project, where a short chain of command led directly to the Minister. Success stemmed from political and public visibility.
	3.6	HT noted that concepts were moving up a level from processes towards tools. The right information had to be available at decision points that were ad hoc and not tightly defined within a process. It was agreed that this should be the level at which the group should operate.
	3.7	HT outlined the different ways interoperability could be achieved – either everything could be thrown away and replaced by one system, or open standards could be used that allowed anything to be used provided it had a compliant interface. Large suppliers were happy to collaborate on standards and compete on implementation.
	3.8	BM suggested that the group should look at the interoperability frameworks Government had already put in place and assess their effectiveness in the political environment. This was agreed – MPs would be only too aware of lack of interoperability from their constituency surgeries. It would also help build up the political pressure to enable government initiatives to work and ensure e-gif standards were implemented over a given timescale and cost, and that they achieved their objectives.
	3.9	AN noted that at some “one-stop-shops”, information from many systems was drawn to one transaction point operated by someone who understood that system. The other integration approach was to do it centrally, which was a harder, longer-term process. Government should be reminded that modern systems comprised people as well as computing facilities, which could interoperate where they intersected. PB agreed and noted that there was also an intermediate solution - an integrating system in the middle tier, between the silos and the operator, which led to a “one-screen” view.
	3.10	BM noted that some systems were process-driven to trigger automatic interaction to drive down costs but push towards human intervention beyond a certain threshold of complexity.
4		Standards
	4.1	Govt had a tendency to throw responsibility on to suppliers to come up with interoperable standards, but had not created any drivers to make this happen. Supplier incentives must also be identified. PV asked for views from IBM and oracle on this.
	4.2	It was agreed that one important part of the message was that good progress was being made. PV suggested that major suppliers might present case studies of successful interoperability. Most government contracts were so tightly prescribed that even “win-win” improvements were not allowed during the contract, and data could not be moved between applications. The group should find points of leverage in this field and publicise some examples. (eg the Ferranti Bloodhound case).
	4.3	All agreed that commercial contracting usually demanded open interfaces. Government should emulate this practice, as recommended by e-GIF, so that additional applications could be added on as and when they were needed.
	4.4	AN noted that e-gif was not a cure-all, but a standard gateway into old legacy systems to extract XML-compliant messages. Gradually suppliers would migrate data to more standard formats.
	4.5	DR noted that the main agent of interoperability was the interface, not the black box. The interface was a means of verifying openness against a set of requirements. Testing and justification were key to interoperability. Customers could now make compliance mandatory in their procurement process.
	4.6	Most standards had been forged by vendors, rather than customers. Government departments should be able to collaborate as well as vendors.
	4.7	PV noted that a critical mass of major suppliers strongly supporting the mandating of a group of open standards would comprise a powerful lobby. EURIM membership alone included suppliers for 80% of government systems. He suggested the group should establish which current initiatives were actively supported by major players.
	4.8	HT noted that Internet standards groups already existed such as W3C, (World Wide Web Consortium – who had come up with protocols like HTML), OASIS (Organisation for Advancement of Structured Information Standards – working with the UN on EDI standards like EBXML for cross border trade) and IETF (Internet Engineering Task Force). There was some overlap between these groups and most standards took the form of protocols or recommendations but there was real interoperation over the web.
5		Other comments
	5.1	It was agreed that information architectures should be not be prescriptive but instead comprise a common set of principles that left the individual architect free to interpret the needs of a particular organisation. Requirements for hospitals and defence establishment would never be alike but could operate within the same framework.
	5.2	All agreed that whilst common data was an ultimate goal, they had to live with the autonomous world for the moment. Education and lobbying was needed in areas where things were not working so well.
	5.3	BN stressed the need to identify incentives for suppliers to adopt open standards. The price Government and the citizen would pay for non-adoption should also be emphasised. There were major funding issues involved here. Effective interoperability should drive down costs. BM noted that current project approval mechanisms took this into account, including the interoperability dimension between government departments. OGC had strategic responsibility for standards
	5.4	DR noted that, regarding R&D tax credits, Treasury had already worked out the advantages to the economy, in terms of the eventual tax benefits, of interoperability. HT agreed that the Treasury agenda for joining up government was a viable subject for influence and would continue to be so.
6		Positioning the group’s message
	6.1	It was agreed that the group should aim to deliver a set of messages at the political level plus a reference “back-up” that identified the common ground between major suppliers.
	6.2	BN identified one powerful political message – that interoperability ranked as the main contender for the Government’s failure to meet its Modernising Government objectives by the year 2005. Cross-reference to the e-GIF report would strengthen this point. It was agreed that this kind of message would generate political activity.
	6.3	PB noted that interoperability could be seen from the opposite perspective – as an enabler of joined-up-government rather than as a barrier to it. If real interoperability existed between departments then joined up government would have been achieved.
	6.4	It was agreed that the group would only drive action on issues that concerned delivery or value to the customer, and for which there was political imperative.
	6.5	All agreed there was a major educational task at hand.
	6.6	All agreed they should try and help identify the critical factors that would enable government to achieve their 2005 target.
	6.7	It was agreed that within the wide remit of interoperability the group must focus exclusively where real value could be added. In EURIM’s case this would be addressing the political dimensions. They must equip politicians to ask the right questions and to know when they were being fobbed off. They would seek points of leverage and apply pressure where necessary.
	6.8	PV qualified the overall aim:- not to cause modernising Government to happen differently, but to speed up the process so that it could become a reality within the timescale government had set for itself. Their target should be the Select Committee on Public Administration.
	6.9	All agreed that many good things were being done and they should publicise examples of good practice, particularly those involving more than one major supplier. DR noted that good case studies of successful implementation of open standards existed (eg NASA) and should be used to promote the benefits of interoperability. Recent progress in the NHS on the common architectural framework, the Welsh Community Health project and the MoD Defence information architecture were also proposed.
7		Chairman’s Summary and Actions Agreed
	7.1	HT summarised the outcome of the discussion. Three ways forward were open to them:
	7.2	1) Education- there was a need for a “politician-friendly” short guide to interoperability issues. 2) There were excellent examples and case studies, which should be used as illustrative material to highlight the issues in the guide. 3) These complementary documents could then be used for political leverage.
	7.3	It was therefore agreed that the physical output of the group should take the form of two documents – an overview of issues for parliamentarians and a supporting document comprising case studies. HT agreed to prepare an outline for the former for comment and review, and a skeleton structure for the latter to which members were invited to submit case studies. He agreed to have this initial draft ready at the end of November.	HT
	7.4	All agreed to comment on this draft and suggest useful case studies for the supportive document.	ALL
	7.5	It was agreed that the group should aim to have a revised draft ready for circulation to the rest of EURIM by February 2002.
	7.6	It was agreed that the draft “guide” would comprise an overview as follows: · A definition of what was meant by interoperability · An illustration of the benefits of interoperability · A summary of the obstacles to interoperability under the current framework. · An outline of strategies that could actually make it happen despite these obstacles · A short progress report on e-GIF, praising the achievements and identifying what else was required. · A list of recommendations and actions that could be implemented immediately
	7.7	It was agreed that representatives from major suppliers and other appropriate organisations be invited to join the group. BN agreed to make some suggestions.	BN
8		Next Meeting Date
	8.1	The next meeting would be held early in the new year. A provisional date of Tuesday 8^th January, 2-4pm was suggested and would shortly be confirmed.

Attendance – 19^th November 2001

Name	Surname	Organisation
Henryk	Trzebiatowski	Consignia
Michele	Barker	SITPRO
Paul	Butler	IBM
Emma	Fryer	EURIM
Chris	Godwin	IBM
Charlie	Hedgecock	SITPRO
Brian	McCandless	Oracle
Barbara	Nielsen	EURIM
Adrian	Norman	BCS
David	Rose	The Procurement Forum
Keith	Wood	FEI
Apologies
Andrew	Bowen	OGC
John	Cheetham	ICL
Jeremy	Crump	CISCO
Nigel	Greenaway	ICL
Malcolm	Herbert	Red Hat
Nick	Kalisperas	CSSA
Dave	Lovell	Ordnance Survey
Innis	Montgomery	Parliamentary Communications Directorate
Jeremy	O’Sullivan	EC Representative in the UK
Chris	Rawlins	BBA
Lord	Renwick	EURIM
Martin	Roe	Consignia
Matthew	Taylor	Parliamentary Communications Directorate
Dorota	Warren
Edward	Wood	House of Commons Library

Possible Case Studies

Project	Main illustrative points, success/failure	Contact
1. Ferranti Bloodhound Project	Failure: implementation of win-win refinements prevented by inflexible contract	PV
2. NASA	Successful implementation of open standards with different suppliers, leading to reduced costs, etc.	DR
3. NHS Common Architectural framework	Holistic approach bringing success	?
4. MoD Defence Information Architecture	“ “	BM
5. Newham project		AN
6. Irish Government IT Project	Success due to accountability, end-to-end ownership	DR
7. Police / Criminal Justice System	Failure – no end-to-end ownership, many stakeholders	BM